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Multiculturalism as a political programme is under attack from politicians, journalists, and academics. The 
criticisms it faces are many and varied: that it presupposes an essentialist conception of culture that treats culture 
as something which is static, homogeneous, and bounded; that it gives unfair advantages to minority cultural 
and religious groups through special provisions such as exemptions from laws and policies; and that it 
encourages cultural communities to form separate parallel societies rather than integrate. It is the last of these 
criticisms that has been particularly prominent in Britain over the past fifteen years. But when it is said that 
multicultural policies in Britain have discouraged integration, we need to be clear about what is meant by both 
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘integration’. The latter is variously defined as a process of mutual adjustment, as sharing 
a national identity, and as participation on equal terms by members of different cultural groups in the major 
spheres of society. Once the necessary distinctions have been drawn, it is far from clear that multiculturalism 
discourages integration. But doubts can also be raised about whether integration is always desirable, or whether 
the more integrated a society becomes, the better. Although integration has been regarded as an important goal, 
for various reasons that I shall explore it needs to be treated with caution. 
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Multiculturalism as a political programme has come under fire in Britain from politicians and 
journalists (Goodhart 2013, Cameron 2011, M. Phillips 2005, Steyn 2005, and West 2013), 
whilst at a more general level its theoretical underpinnings have been targeted by academics 
(Cantle 2012, and Barry 2001). The criticisms it faces are many and varied: that it 
presupposes an essentialist conception of culture that treats cultures as static, homogeneous, 
and bounded, with the result that multicultural policies tend to entrench traditional practices 
and promote the interests of established elites within cultural communities (Barry 2001, and 
Kukathas 2003);1 that it gives unfair advantages to minority cultural and religious groups 
through additional funding and special provisions such as exemptions from laws and policies 
(Barry 2001);2 that it is bad for women (Okin 1999); that it discourages cultural communities 
from integrating and encourages them to form separate parallel societies (Goodhart 2013, 
West 2013).  
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It is the last one of these criticisms that I propose to examine in this article because it 
has played a prominent role in the public debate over multiculturalism that has taken place in 
Britain during the past fifteen or so years. When it is said that multicultural policies have 
discouraged integration, we need to be clear about what is meant by both ‘multiculturalism’ 
and ‘integration’ since each of these terms means different things to different people. Once 
the necessary distinctions have been drawn, it is at the very least questionable whether these 
policies discourage integration. Even if they have fostered a degree of separation between 
cultural and religious groups in Britain, that might not be a bad thing since doubts can be 
raised about whether integration in its different senses is always desirable, and whether it is 
always the case that the more integrated a society becomes, the better. Furthermore, although 
integration in more than one of its senses has been regarded as an important goal by 
successive British governments, policies that aim to promote it need to be treated with 
caution, and there are moral limits to the means through which it can be legitimately pursued. 
In exploring these issues, I do not aim to provide a systematic defence of multicultural laws 
and policies, but rather to show that they need not come into conflict with policies that aim to 
facilitate integration in any of the common meanings given to the idea of integration. I shall 
also offer some grounds for thinking that multicultural laws and policies may play a role in 
promoting one of the conditions that helps to create or sustain a reasonably just society. 
1. Multiculturalism and separation 
In his Munich Security Conference speech delivered in February 2011, David Cameron 
distanced himself from what he called ‘state multiculturalism’, claiming that ‘[u]nder the 
doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate 
lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision 
of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated 
communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values’ (Cameron 2011). 
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To some extent Cameron’s speech marked a change in rhetoric towards multiculturalism, but 
it is not clear that it signalled a radical break in policy from that of the two previous Labour 
governments. Ever since the Cantle Report (2001) into the disturbances (as they were called) 
in various northern towns in the late spring and early summer of 2001, politicians from 
different parties have expressed concern at the perceived separation between different ethnic 
and religious groups in various towns and cities, with multiculturalism providing a 
convenient scapegoat. On closer inspection, however, it is unclear why anyone should think 
that multiculturalism, understood as a state-supported normative approach to cultural 
diversity, has the intention or the effect of encouraging different ethnic or religious groups to 
form ‘parallel societies’. 
The term ‘multiculturalism’ is used in very different ways, and it is implausible to 
suppose that there is one uniquely correct way of understanding it. Nevertheless it would be 
perverse in a British context to define it in a way that makes it fundamentally opposed to 
integration. In giving an adequate explanation of what ‘multiculturalism’ has meant in 
Britain, we would surely need to make reference to the way in which rules, laws and policies 
have been interpreted with some sensitivity to their effects on cultural and religious 
minorities, and indeed the way in which various exemptions from rules and laws have been 
provided when these rules and laws have been thought to place unreasonable burdens on 
members of these groups. So, for example, legislation governing cremation has come to be 
interpreted so that it permits open air funeral pyres; male Sikhs have been permitted to ride 
motorcycles without crash helmets provided that they wear turbans; school meal menus have 
been adapted in order to provide halal food choices; rules governing school uniform and 
company dress codes have been revised so that they are consistent with the requirements of 
different religions. One of the key motivations behind these accommodations has been to 
prevent minority groups from becoming marginalised, to ensure that they enjoy equality of 
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opportunity, and to prevent them from being torn between two different moral rules or codes 
of conduct as a result of their religious and cultural beliefs. In other words it would seem that 
one of the main impulses behind them has been to promote integration rather than encourage 
separation.  
Multiculturalism, it seems to me, is best characterised as the public recognition or 
accommodation of minority cultures, or more specifically, as the recognition or 
accommodation of cultural minorities in the design of legislatures, in the formulation and 
interpretation of laws and policies, or in the choice of rules to govern public institutions. This 
is a very broad definition. It allows the possibility of different varieties of multiculturalism 
that are grounded in different normative principles and place different moral limits on the 
accommodation of cultural minorities. Understood in this way, multiculturalism is perfectly 
consistent with regarding some of the practices of a minority – or a minority within a 
minority – as intolerable. And multiculturalism is not inherently opposed to integration. It 
might be said, however, that when it is understood in these terms, multiculturalism doesn’t 
have any inherent commitment to promoting integration either, and that over time it has 
developed in Britain in a way that neglects the importance of integration. Relevant here is a 
distinction that David Goodhart has drawn between liberal and separatist multiculturalism. 
Whilst liberal multiculturalism is prepared to extend special treatment to minorities ‘when 
this helps to integrate them better as equal citizens into mainstream society’, that is, ‘within 
an already existing culture and political system’, separatist multiculturalism ‘privileges 
minority identities over common citizenship’, ‘wants to positively promote and fund ethnic 
difference’, and ‘regards a core national culture as either non-existent or illegitimate’ 
(Goodhart 2013). Goodhart claims that in Britain during the late 1970s and early 1980s a 
policy of liberal multiculturalism morphed into one of separatist multiculturalism at the local 
level.  
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Whether a shift of this kind really happened in Britain is contestable.3  Many of the 
policies that Goodhart regards as indicative of a separatist multiculturalist approach could 
also be regarded as part of a liberal multiculturalist agenda. For example, the ‘single identity 
funding’ that he sees as central to separatist multiculturalism might be defended on the 
grounds that allocating funds to groups defined along ethnic or religious lines enables these 
groups to flourish and their members to develop a more confident sense of their identity, 
which it turn makes it easier for them to integrate (Goodhart 2013, pp. 190ff). Goodhart 
might reply that even if this were the rationale behind such funding, its effect has been to 
foster parallel societies or communities and to discourage integration. But even if it is true 
that multiculturalism in Britain has developed in such a way that it has had the effect of not 
encouraging integration or positively discouraging it, this would at best give grounds for 
reforming multiculturalism rather than abandoning it.  
In any case, before we can even properly judge whether British multiculturalism has 
neglected the importance of integration and, if it has, whether this is a problem, we need to be 
clear about what integration itself means. My contention here is that ‘integration’ has been 
used to refer to very different phenomena in British policy documents and the speeches of 
politicians and public figures, in a way that is unhelpful. And when these different 
understandings are combined with the academic literature on the subject, the potential for 
confusion is even greater. What I propose to do, therefore, is to distinguish these different 
meanings of integration, relate them to both the academic literature and to public 
pronouncements on the issue, and then ask why it should be thought that integration, in the 
different senses distinguished, is valuable.4  
2. The meanings of ‘integration’ 
In British public debate, there has been a tradition of distinguishing integration from 
assimilation that goes back at least as far as a speech made by Roy Jenkins in 1966 shortly 
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after he became Home Secretary (Jenkins 1967, p. 267). I’m not going to examine his attempt 
or indeed the history of attempts to distinguish these two ideas. Instead I am going to take as 
my starting point the way in which Tariq Modood draws the distinction between them in 
Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (2013). According to Modood, what distinguishes assimilation 
from integration is fundamentally that assimilation is a one-way process in which minority 
cultural groups change at least some of their customs, practices, and forms of behaviour in 
order to fit in with the dominant or majority group’s way of doing things. In contrast, 
integration is a two way process which involves mutual adjustment and adaptation (Modood 
2013, p. 44, and Kymlicka 1995, p. 96). We might call this the process account of 
integration. It is a perfectly coherent way of drawing the distinction between integration and 
assimilation. No doubt in practice the majority group always shifts its ground to some degree 
in response to immigration and the presence of minority groups, but there are nevertheless 
key differences between integrationism and assimilationism when they are understood as 
normative policy approaches: for example, the latter, unlike the former, may suppose that 
minorities are morally required to change their practices without any such changes being 
morally required of the majority group.  
When the distinction is drawn in this way it is easy to see why someone might regard 
a policy of integration as preferable to one of assimilation on grounds of fairness – and 
indeed why it might be thought that if there is a duty to integrate, then it binds the majority 
group as well as minority groups. Those who regard integration as a two-way process, and 
think fairness requires that there should be mutual adaptation in the face of the problems of 
cohabitation that arise from cultural and religious diversity, need not mean that on each and 
every issue, each side should give a bit. There are some issues where minorities may be 
required to shift their ground, others where the majority may be required to do so. For 
example, it might plausibly be held that it is reasonable to require immigrants in Britain to 
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learn English, and to suppose that they have a duty to do so (though whether this duty should 
be enforced as a condition of granting citizenship is more controversial). And it might 
plausibly be held that it is reasonable to require the majority to accept the reform of laws 
when they come into conflict with the norms of a minority religion, at least when no injustice 
would be involved in doing so.  
The idea that both immigrant groups and the indigenous majority should each adapt 
its practices when cultural or religious differences create problems is open to question, 
however. Goodhart, for one, is sceptical: 
Citizens in modern democracies have ‘squatters’ rights’; beyond treating 
newcomers fairly there is no obligation on them to change. It is the immigrant 
who has freely chosen to join an already existing society and must carry the 
burden of any adaptation that is necessary for a fruitful life. (Goodhart 2013 
p.70, see also p. 204) 
Goodhart’s argument here for why the majority group is under no obligation to change or 
adapt is problematic. First, we cannot plausibly say that children and second generation 
members of immigrant groups freely chose to immigrate, yet they may be socialised into the 
ways of these groups and speak a different first language to the majority in the society they 
have joined, with the consequence that the ‘burdens of adaptation’ they face are high through 
no fault of their own. Secondly, there may be goods the production of which are required for 
the flourishing of all of those living in a country but which would be much easier to create if 
there is mutual adaptation. Under these circumstances, sharing fairly the costs of producing 
these goods may require both sides to change their behaviour. It may even be the case that 
these goods could not in practice be created without mutual adaptation and their importance 
for the development or maintenance of a reasonably just society might be sufficient to justify 
the claim that minority groups and the majority group are each under a duty to change their 
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ways. Suppose, for example, that certain kinds of bonds between the members of a state are 
required in order to provide the mutual trust that is necessary for a just society to be created 
and sustained, but these bonds are unlikely to be forged unless there is mutual adaptation (see 
Miller 1995, pp. 93-96).5 Would this not justify the claim that both minority groups and the 
majority group have a duty to change their behaviour? 
This second point draws attention to the fact that a process account of integration 
considered on its own has no substantive content. Indeed if we adopt such an account it is not 
clear what a policy of integration would look like, or indeed what a duty to integrate would 
entail. According to the process account, integration occurs when different cultural groups, 
including the majority group, adjust their various practices, traditions and customs to fit in 
with each other. But this account does not specify in what ‘direction’ those practices, customs 
and traditions need to change for integration to occur, nor does it identify a goal at which 
integration should aim. When integration is understood solely in accordance with the process 
account, in order to promote it the state might put in place structures or procedures that 
facilitated engagement between minority groups and the majority group under conditions of 
equality, so that changes were freely negotiated rather than imposed, without any 
presumption that it is cultural minorities that always have to change their ways, but that is 
about as far as a policy of integration could go. A policy of integration of this kind would 
nevertheless be consistent with multiculturalism and indeed could be multicultural in 
character in so far as the structures created for facilitating dialogue provided cultural 
minorities with public recognition of some kind (see Parekh, 2000, pp. 219-224, 268-273, and 
306-307). 
The notion of integration that has informed British policy discussions has been rather 
different from this process account, however, because it does specify a goal at which policies 
should aim. In fact it seems to me that there are really two goals that lie behind the rhetoric of 
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integration in Britain, signifying two further concepts of integration that need to be 
distinguished from one another. I shall refer to them as teleological accounts. According to 
the first, a society is integrated to the extent that its members share a national identity; 
according to the second account, a society is integrated to the extent that members of socially 
significant groups participate together on equal terms in the major spheres or domains of 
society, such as work, education, politics, and civil society. Let me refer to the first of these 
accounts as the national identity account and to the second as the interaction account.  
We can see Cameron sliding between the interaction account and the national identity 
account in comments that he makes in his Munich Security Conference speech (2011). He 
says that: ‘Instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared 
national identity that is open to everyone’. Here he moves seamlessly from a claim about lack 
of integration in something like the second sense – that is, groups living apart in a way that 
means they do not participate together in different spheres – to a claim about the importance 
of integration in the first sense – that is, of sharing a national identity. But there is no 
necessary connection between these two different senses. The members of a society could 
live together, in the sense of participating together as equals in the major spheres of society, 
without sharing a national identity, and they could share a national identity whilst leading 
separate lives. In reply it might be said that even though this is true conceptually, it is false 
empirically: although there is no logically necessary connection between integration in the 
interaction sense and integration in the national identity sense, in practice they go hand in 
hand. But that too is questionable: it is far from obvious that interacting together on equal 
terms in different spheres of society will lead to the sharing of a national identity, and it 
seems possible for people to come to share a national identity as a result of having it 
inculcated in them at school even if they are educated, live and work in separate self-
contained cultural communities. 
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Note that a commitment to integration as a policy in either of these teleological senses 
might be combined with a commitment to integration in the process sense. It might be 
thought that a society in which members of different groups participate together on equal 
terms in its major spheres should be achieved in part through a process of mutual adjustment, 
with both the majority group and minority groups changing their practices and patterns of 
behaviour in order to do so. And it might be thought that a shared national identity should be 
negotiated between the majority group and minority groups in a way that involves adaptation 
on each side, with that process of negotiation and mutual adaptation perhaps continuing 
indefinitely in the light of changes in social and political circumstances. 
I don’t think it is profitable to ask which of these different accounts of integration is 
the correct or best one. Although the interaction account seems to me to come closest to 
capturing the ordinary meaning of the term, there are a range of different possible meanings 
that can reasonably be assigned to it and, within this range, it is open to academics and indeed 
politicians to define the term in the way that suits them, though nothing is gained in terms of 
intellectual illumination if they simply slide between different senses. So in the remaining 
two sections of the article I shall explore the question of whether integration in either or both 
of these teleological senses is valuable, whether it should be pursued as a policy goal, and if 
so, whether it can be combined with a commitment to multiculturalism, that is, with a 
commitment to the recognition or accommodation of cultural minorities in the formulation 
and interpretation of laws and policies, and in the design of rules for public institutions. 
3. Integration as interaction 
Elizabeth Anderson offers an interaction account of integration. According to her, integration 
‘consists in the full participation on terms of equality of socially significant groups in all 
domains of society’ (Anderson 2010, p.113). She argues that integration is valuable and 
indeed an imperative for creating a just society. She provides two main arguments for that 
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conclusion, backed by a wealth of empirical evidence, largely from the United States. First, 
she argues that when minority groups lead separate lives they are generally deprived of 
access to opportunities, resources, and social capital that are available to the majority or 
dominant group.6 Second, she argues that when groups lead separate lives, this can reinforce 
stigmatizing stereotypes, lead to the growth of prejudice and mistrust and to a lack of respect, 
and thereby fuel discrimination. Integration, in contrast, promotes the trust and respect that is 
either required for a just society to be created and sustained, or that facilitates the creation 
and maintenance of such a society.7  
The second of these arguments builds on Gordon Allport’s contact hypothesis in 
social psychology (Allport 1954, and Anderson (2010), pp. 123-27). According to that 
hypothesis, contact between members of different groups tends to reduce prejudice when 
various conditions are met, in particular, when the contact concerned is frequent enough to 
lead to personal acquaintance, involves cooperation in pursuit of shared goals, is supported 
by institutional authorities, and takes place amongst participants that are accorded equal 
status. For convenience, let me call contact that meets the first two of these conditions 
‘meaningful interaction’ and contact that meets all four of them ‘ideal interaction’. Although 
the contact hypothesis is still controversial, there is a body of evidence that supports it, and it 
is no exaggeration to say that it is well-confirmed (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Anderson 
argues that not only is ideal interaction likely to reduce prejudice and promote respect, it is 
also likely to reduce the feelings of anxiety and discomfort that otherwise occur when 
members of different groups come into contact with each other, and to reduce stigmatisation. 
Anderson’s argument for the importance of integration is powerful. But it leaves open 
the issue of whether segregation is a problem in Britain. Consider the question of whether 
British towns and cities exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. This is a 
controversial issue amongst those who have researched it. The conclusion one reaches seems 
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to depend in part on how one measures residential segregation. By using what is called ‘the 
index of dissimilarity’, which measures how evenly groups are spread out across an area, 
Ludi Simpson argues that residential segregation in Britain is largely a myth (Simpson 2004, 
Finney and Simpson 2009, Ch. 6). But this conclusion is contested by others. Ron Johnston, 
James Forrest and Mike Poulsen claim that the index used by Simpson can hide 
concentrations of minority groups, and they use a rather different measure – one that draws 
upon the definition of segregation employed in another index, ‘the index of isolation’ – to 
argue for a different conclusion, namely, that although ‘concentration into areas to the 
relative exclusion of all others is rare in English cities’, there are extensive concentrations of 
minorities of ‘ghetto-like proportions’ in some places, ‘of Indians in Leicester and, to a lesser 
extent, Bradford and Kirklees; of Pakistanis in Bradford, Oldham and Leicester; and of 
Bangladeshis in Oldham and, to a lesser extent again, Bradford and Sandwell’ (Johnston et al 
2002, p.608).   
The index of dissimilarity and the index of isolation provide contrasting perspectives. 
Johnston and his co-authors argue that ‘[n]either index is right and neither is wrong: it 
depends on what you want to measure’ (Johnston et al 2005, p. 1223).  From the point of 
view of Allport’s contact hypothesis, it would seem that both indexes could have some 
relevance, for they both have a bearing on the extent to which individuals from different 
ethnic and religious groups are likely to have opportunities for meaningful interaction. In this 
respect, however, residential patterns are unlikely to be decisive, whatever the truth is about 
them in Britain. There is no guarantee even in neighbourhoods in which members of different 
ethnic groups live side by side that they will interact meaningfully (Uslaner, 2012, p. 42). 
Furthermore, even though shared neighbourhoods provide opportunities for interaction to 
take place, other potential sites may be as important, or more important, for facilitating it, 
such as workplaces and schools, not least because in these it may be harder for members of 
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different groups to avoid meaningful interaction. It could be that provided members of each 
group interact meaningfully with members of others groups in at least one important sphere, 
this is enough in the presence of the other supporting conditions to reduce levels of prejudice 
and help to achieve the level of mutual trust that is necessary for creating and sustaining a 
reasonably just society (Uslaner 2012, p. 43).8 Integration in the interaction sense can be a 
matter of degree and it may be that we don’t need a particularly high degree of it to be in a 
position to foster that level of trust; other factors, such as the design of trustworthy public 
institutions, may then be more important. 
If we take seriously the idea that integration is valuable in the interaction sense 
because it reduces prejudice, fosters mutual trust and mutual respect, and promotes equality 
of opportunity, and that a particular degree of it in one or more spheres or domains is 
therefore necessary to create the conditions for a just society, then there are a number of ways 
in which this could be sought as a policy goal. School catchment areas might be drawn up so 
that they extend across diverse neighbourhoods, with the result that schools themselves are 
likely to become more diverse. We might be less willing to support the establishment of new 
publically-funded faith schools because of the way in which they may contribute to the 
separation of religious communities, and we might subject existing schools of this kind to 
greater regulation, for example, it might be insisted they should admit a certain percentage of 
pupils from outside the religion to which they adhere if they are to receive public funding.9 
Public housing might be distributed in a way that tries to ensure the presence of different 
cultural and religious groups in a neighbourhood. Public spaces, including parks, libraries, 
museums and art galleries, could be made more welcoming and of more interest to diverse 
ethnic and religious groups, with a greater presence of community police officers to ensure 
that harassment or intimidation of minorities is minimised. Civil associations, designed to 
promote dialogue between different groups, might be given public funding. Cameron himself 
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argues for the need ‘to encourage meaningful and active participation in society’, in part to 
establish common purposes ‘as people come together and work together in their 
neighbourhoods’. The importance of integration in the interaction sense may also provide an 
additional argument for a voluntary National Citizen Service: in the same speech, Cameron 
gestured towards a two-month programme of this kind ‘for sixteen-year-olds from different 
backgrounds to live and work together’ (see also Goodhart 2013, pp. 315-316). 
All these policies are perfectly compatible with a commitment to multiculturalism in 
the broad sense I distinguished earlier. They do not stand in the way of providing public 
recognition to cultural and religious minorities and indeed some of the measures described 
may involve giving that recognition, for example, making the contents of libraries, museums 
and art galleries of more interest to those from minorities by including books and artefacts 
that are more relevant to their lives and their histories. But there are other policy measures to 
which the value of integration in the interaction sense might seem to lend some support that 
are in tension with a multiculturalist approach. For example, the value of integration in this 
sense might be thought to support laws or rules prohibiting the wearing of full-face veils in 
public, or in certain types of public interaction or public roles. Sometimes the argument for 
insisting that women’s faces should be uncovered rests on a view of what is needed to 
perform particular roles effectively – for example, it has been argued that school teachers are 
unable to communicate as effectively with a full-face veil (BBC 2006a),10 or that a jury 
should be able to see the faces of witnesses or defendants when they giving evidence in court 
in order to be able to make up their mind about what weight to give to it (BBC 2013)11 – but 
often the argument is simply that a full-face veil puts up a barrier of a kind that discourages 
meaningful interaction (BBC 2006b).12 A multicultural approach can without any 
inconsistency regard some minority practices as intolerable, but its claim to accommodate or 
give public recognition to cultural minorities would be cast into doubt if it were to sanction 
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coercive restrictions on minority practices when these practices do not involve the violation 
of individual rights.  
It would be a mistake, however, to think that this argument shows that valuing 
integration in the interaction sense is incompatible with multiculturalism or that its value 
gives grounds for rejecting multiculturalism. Rather, it shows that a single-minded focus on 
the value of integration in the interaction sense can itself threaten individual rights, and that 
there are limits to the means that can be legitimately pursued in order to promote integration 
in this sense. Laws against the wearing of a niqab or burqa in public places seem to be an 
unjust encroachment on individual liberty even if we put aside the issue of whether they 
restrict the legitimate freedom to practice one's religion. Even if it were true that those who 
wear the niqab or burqa intend to put up barriers to meaningful interaction, it is not clear that 
the state could legitimately prevent them from doing so. No doubt punks who dye their hair 
orange, and wear safety-pins in their jackets, intend to put up barriers between them and 
others, but surely any society that prizes individual liberty has to permit (within wide 
parameters) people to wear what they choose, and style their hair in the way they want, even 
if this has some adverse effects on social cohesion. Some trade-offs may be possible here: for 
example, it may be permissible in some circumstances to enact unjust policies in order to 
promote the conditions for a just society. Elsewhere I have argued that citizenship tests deny 
the automatic moral entitlement of long term residents to citizenship but may nevertheless be 
justified all things considered if we have good reason to think that these tests facilitate 
integration in the interaction sense and in doing so foster the conditions for establishing or 
sustaining a just society (see Mason 2014, pp. 145-148). But there are dangers in travelling 
along this path. For often we are balancing the certainty of an injustice that would be caused 
by a particular measure against the possibility, or mere probability, that this measure may 
promote those conditions.  
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There is also a further set of questions about the weight and significance that should 
be accorded to the contact hypothesis in the unjust or “non-ideal” conditions that characterise 
British society, and whether integration is always beneficial under these conditions. Michael 
Merry argues that under non-ideal circumstances in which minority groups are stigmatised, 
integration in the interaction sense might not be the best way of enhancing equality or 
cultivating the capacities required for good citizenship, and that there may in consequence be 
good reasons for stigmatised groups to favour ‘voluntary separation’ (Merry 2013, Ch. 2).13 
First, these groups may not benefit to any great extent from integrating in this sense. They 
may still be prevented from gaining access to opportunities and networks that the dominant 
group enjoy. There is no guarantee that members of the dominant group will make these 
opportunities available to minority groups; indeed they may be skilled at keeping these 
opportunities for members of their own group (Merry 2013, pp.42-45). Second, contact 
between groups may not be of the kind that is likely to lead to the cultivation of mutual 
respect or the erosion of stereotypes. The conditions under which Allport’s hypothesis 
specifies that contact will reduce prejudice, such as the support of institutional authorities, or 
its occurring between those of equal status, may not be met, and indeed prejudice may grow 
(Merry 2013, pp.32-33). Employing the terminology introduced earlier, the interactions 
involved might not be meaningful, and even if they are meaningful they might not meet the 
other conditions required for them to be ideal. Third, voluntary separation may give 
minorities a more confident sense of their own identity, and provide the conditions for them 
to acquire self-respect, free from forms of bullying and stereotyping to which members of 
stigmatised minorities are often subjected (Merry 2013, pp.32, 43, 69-72). This is especially 
the case in schools where pupils from minority faith families might be educated together and 
in the process acquire a better understanding of their own faith traditions. So, in summary, 
under some non-ideal circumstances, integration may not carry with it the same benefits, and 
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stigmatised minority groups may benefit to a greater extent from choosing to separate in one 
or more spheres of activity, particularly education. 
In the light of the concerns about policies of integration in the interaction sense, they 
should be treated with caution. A fully integrated society in which groups, though they retain 
their particular identities, participate as equals and interact meaningfully in all the major 
spheres of society, may not be required in order to create the conditions for a just society. 
Degrees and kinds of integration that fall short of this standard may be sufficient when other 
conditions are favourable, whilst under non-ideal circumstances, we shouldn’t simply 
suppose that integration will yield the same benefits that it would under more favourable 
conditions. And we have to recognise that even when integration in the interaction sense has 
value, its value needs to be weighed against any potential reduction in freedom that policies 
that seek to promote it would involve; as I have already noted, in some cases (for example, 
the adoption of laws that forbid the wearing of full-face veils in public) these policies may 
even threaten individual rights.  
4. Integration as sharing a national identity 
In the UK, the most common version of the national identity account maintains that Britain is 
integrated to the extent that its citizens share a national identity based on “British” values. 
Understood in these terms, a policy of integration that aims to promote a shared national 
identity seems consistent with a commitment to multiculturalism characterised in the broad 
way that I have done, at least provided that the values selected as the basis for the national 
identity are relatively thin and acceptable to those from diverse religious and cultural groups. 
But why should we think that it is valuable for Britain, or indeed any society, to be integrated 
in this sense?  
For Cameron, the importance of sharing a national identity forged around British 
values seems to lie, at least in part, in avoiding the alienation that he thinks can play a role in 
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fuelling terrorism. In relation to young Muslims in Britain who are attracted to extremism, he 
believes that ‘we’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to 
belong’ (Cameron 2011, see also Home Office 2011, p.44). In effect Cameron attaches 
importance to a shared national identity because he thinks it is crucial that those living in 
Britain should come to identify with their society in order to counter the threat that extremism 
and “radicalisation” pose to security and individual rights. Even if the role of alienation in 
bolstering that threat is being exaggerated, there is reason to think that alienation is a bad 
thing and that the creation and smooth functioning of reasonably just institutions will be 
facilitated by its reduction.  
It is ultimately an empirical issue what enables citizens to identify with the 
institutions under which they live. But the endorsement of liberal-democratic values seems 
insufficient to provide the basis for a strong identification with institutions that realise these 
values, however much we might wish that it did. Indeed, allegiance to liberal-democratic 
values seems to provide no more reason to identify with British institutions than it does to 
identify with any other country’s institutions that realise those values to a significant degree, 
and the fact that they are embodied to some degree in the institutions that govern the lives of 
those who reside in Britain doesn’t seem to provide the kind of link to those institutions that 
would facilitate a strong identification with them. It is presumably for this reason that 
Cameron thinks it is important for people living in Britain to share British values and to see 
those values reflected in British institutions. But one of the challenges Cameron faces in 
providing what he sees as the solution to the problem of alienation is to present a vision of a 
shared national identity that is based on distinctively British values but is nevertheless 
inclusive, that is, can be endorsed by those who belong to a wide variety of religious and 
cultural groups, and by those within the same cultures and religions who have divergent 
conceptions of how to live. He highlights freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
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democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality as key liberal 
values that define national identity: ‘a genuinely liberal country believes in certain values and 
actively promotes them….  It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to 
belong here is to believe in these things’ (Cameron 2011).14 The trouble is that these widely 
shared liberal-democratic values are not distinctively British.  
Cameron’s failure in this respect puts him in the company of former Prime Ministers 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Blair listed Britain’s essential values as ‘belief in democracy, 
the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared 
heritage’ (Blair 2006). Brown argued that a ‘distinctive set of values’ has emerged from ‘the 
long tidal flows of British history’, but his list of liberty, civic responsibility, fairness and 
tolerance does not bear out that claim (Brown 2007).15 The Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society strategy document launched in 2005 singled out ‘respect for others and 
the rule of law, including tolerance and mutual obligations between citizens’ as ‘essential 
elements of Britishness’ (see Home Office 2005, CmCh.4, section 4). When we look at the 
pronouncements of other public figures who think it important for British citizens to share a 
national identity, the values that they mention are equally unexceptional. For example, Trevor 
Phillips, when chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, highlighted values such as ‘an 
attachment to democracy, freedom of speech, and equality’, and traditions such as ‘a common 
language, good manners and our care for children’ (Phillips, T. 2005). 
There are potential responses to the challenge I have posed to the attempt to define 
British national identity in terms of liberal-democratic values, one of which Cameron himself 
offered in a newspaper article: 
Of course, people will say that these values are vital to other people in other 
countries. And, of course, they’re right. But what sets Britain apart are the 
traditions and history that anchors them and allows them to continue to flourish 
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and develop. Our freedom doesn’t come from thin air. It is rooted in our 
parliamentary democracy and free press. Our sense of responsibility and the 
rule of law is attached to our courts and independent judiciary. Our belief in 
tolerance was won through struggle and is linked to the various churches and 
faith groups that have come to call Britain home. These are the institutions that 
help to enforce our values, keep them in check and make sure they apply to 
everyone equally. And taken together, I believe this combination – our values 
and our respect for the history that helped deliver them and the institutions that 
uphold them – forms the bedrock of Britishness (Cameron, 2014). 
Here I take Cameron to be suggesting that British national identity consists not merely in 
allegiance to a set of liberal-democratic values, but also in a commitment to the institutions in 
Britain that embody and promote these values, and respect for the traditions, movements and 
historical events that have created, sustained and reformed these institutions.  
The thought here seems to be that what is distinctively British is the particular form 
liberal-democratic values have taken in Britain, namely, the particular institutions that 
embody these values, and the traditions of thought and historical movements through which 
these institutions have evolved and been nurtured. In order to clarify this possibility, we can 
distinguish two different conceptions of the basis for the shared identification that would 
overcome the alienation from society that some experience: 
(i) Citizens identify with their society because they believe that its institutions 
embody various liberal-democratic values to which they adhere.  
(ii) Citizens identify with their society because they adhere to liberal-
democratic values, they endorse the particular forms that they believe these 
values have taken in their institutions, and they respect the historical 
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movements and traditions of thought that have played a key role in the 
development of these institutions. 
(ii) seems superior to (i) as a solution to a problem of alienation because it describes a more 
psychologically plausible way for citizens to identify strongly with the society to which they 
belong, focusing as it does on the particular form that liberal democratic values take in it and 
on the history of its institutions. (ii) faces a different problem, however. Democracy and 
liberty take a particular form in institutions partly because these institutions give these values 
a particular interpretation – as do the historical movements and traditions of thought that were 
involved in the development of the institutions.16 But particular interpretations of liberal-
democratic values are bound to be contentious – as indeed is the issue of which historical 
movements and events should be regarded as worthy of admiration and respect – and it is 
hard to believe that there are distinctively British interpretations of liberal-democratic values 
that are widely shared. For example, one thing that the furore created by the publication of 
Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses made evident is that British citizens interpret 
freedom of expression and its limits in different ways, and these different interpretations cut 
across ethnic and religious groups: there are those who insist that acts of expression should be 
restricted when they are blasphemous or disrespectful to God or Allah, whilst there are others 
who believe that allowing such acts is part of the very essence of freedom of expression.17 
Even if there were an interpretation of values such as freedom of expression that was 
relatively widely shared, to insist on its acceptance as a condition of belonging (‘to belong 
here is to believe in these things’) would be to define what it is to be British in a way that is 
bound to fail to be adequately inclusive because that definition would exclude some citizens 
who, quite reasonably, interpreted those values differently. 
In response it might be said that even if citizens do not at the moment converge on a 
particular interpretation of liberal values, there is no reason to think that convergence could 
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not happen over time. Indeed we might think that this is why it is important for citizens to be 
involved in a collective re-negotiation of national identity through public dialogue, for such a 
process holds out the promise of uncoerced convergence on the proper interpretation of these 
values. This offers one way in which a process account of integration, understood as mutual 
adjustment, might be combined with a teleological account of integration, understood as 
citizens sharing a particular national identity. And it provides us with a third possible way of 
understanding how shared identification might arise from allegiance to a national identity 
based on common values: 
(iii) Citizens identify with their society because they believe that its 
institutions and practices embody the particular interpretation of liberal-
democratic values that they have each come to endorse as a result of an on-
going public dialogue in which they have had the opportunity to participate. 
But even (iii) seems to me to be unrealistic in Britain. There is no reason to think that in the 
near future, or even over the medium term, British citizens will come to converge on 
particular interpretations of these values through any political process or form of open public 
dialogue, especially since even within the same culture and religion there is a diversity of 
reasonable conceptions of how to live and a diversity of reasonable conceptions of justice.  
The difficulties involved in achieving uncoerced convergence on a particular 
interpretation of liberal-democratic values might motivate us to explore yet another possible 
basis for shared identification: 
(iv) Citizens identify with their society because they endorse liberal-
democratic values, and they believe that its institutions and practices embody 
an interpretation of those values that has emerged with a high degree of 
support from an on-going public dialogue in which they have had the 
 23 
opportunity to participate, even though they may continue to disagree with 
that interpretation. 
According to this conception, shared identification doesn’t seem to provide the basis for a 
shared national identity, at least if we make the plausible assumption that a shared national 
identity, properly so called, requires co-nationals to possess a sense of belonging together, 
that is, to believe that there is some deep reason why they should be fellow citizens, of the 
sort that might be provided by sharing a set of distinctive values or a distinctive interpretation 
of a set of values. In order for the collective identification described in (iv) to be achieved, 
citizens do not need to share anything other than a general commitment to liberal-democratic 
values, together with the belief that their institutions embody an interpretation of these values 
that is a product of a public dialogue in which they have had the opportunity to participate. 
But once we have moved in this direction, away from the idea of a shared national identity 
based on a distinctive set of common values or a shared interpretation of common values, we 
might think that there is a better ideal of shared identification available for us – better because 
it is more inclusive under the circumstances of diversity in which we live. I have described 
this ideal elsewhere (2000, pp. 127-132, 2010 pp.870-871, and 2012, pp. 181-183) as a sense 
of belonging to the polity:  
(v) Citizens identify with their society because (a) they feel ‘at home’ in a 
reasonably wide range of its institutions and practices, whether political 
or non-political, that is, they know their way around these institutions and 
practices and feel at ease in them; and (b) they have their own – perhaps 
distinctive – reasons for valuing these institutions and practices.  
(v) is more inclusive than (iv) because it allows the possibility that citizens may come to 
identify with their society through valuing different institutions or practices in it, or through 
identifying with the same institutions and practices for different reasons – and in a way that 
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does not require them to share the same principles of justice. So, for example, different 
citizens may value the institutions of parliamentary democracy or the National Health Service 
for different reasons. Some may value these institutions partly because of their history, 
whereas others may value them solely for the role they currently play in their society. Some 
may value them because they think that these institutions and the goods they distribute 
compare favourably with those in the countries from which they have emigrated. Some may 
value these institutions on grounds of justice; others may value them because they or their 
family members have benefited from them. Some may find reasons for valuing these 
institutions from within their own particular moral visions or conceptions of how to live, 
whether religious or secular.18 A shared identification of this kind might even include citizens 
who reject at least some liberal values, for example, who think that adultery or homosexuality 
should not be tolerated – though admittedly it would be hard for a citizen to be part of it if she 
rejected all of those values.  
The shared identification described in (i) is more desirable than that described in (v) 
because it would be better if citizens endorsed liberal-democratic values and identified with 
their institutions at least in part because these values were embodied in them. Even if I am 
correct in thinking that this kind of shared identification is unrealisable in the foreseeable 
future, and is in any case unlikely to be sufficient to solve a problem of alienation, there is 
good reason for educational policy to aim at it. The more people that acquire these values, the 
better, so children should receive a civic education in schools that aspires to inculcate them 
(even though it would be misleading to describe them as fundamental British values since 
they are not distinctively British.) But given that some people reject at least some of these 
values, and those who accept them disagree about how best to interpret them, (v) provides a 
more realistic goal to guide public policy beyond civic education, and describes a more 
psychologically plausible way in which people can come to identify strongly with their 
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society. What laws and policies are likely to promote shared identification of the kind 
described in (v) is a complex matter that I do not have the space in this article to explore in 
depth. Members of minority groups will find it harder to develop a sense of belonging to their 
polity if they experience widespread discrimination or hostility from the wider society on the 
basis of their race, ethnicity, or religion, so robust anti-discrimination policies and laws 
against harassment and insulting behaviour in public spaces have an important role to play. 
Multicultural accommodations to prevent members of minority groups from feeling torn 
between two different sets of moral rules or codes of conduct are surely also important in 
order to enable them to feel at home in institutions and practices. Unfortunately these 
accommodations can sometimes adversely affect the cultivation of a widespread sense of 
belonging to the polity.  A particular policy – for example, providing an exemption from a 
requirement that animals be stunned before they are killed for the ritual slaughter of animals 
– may facilitate the identification of members of a minority group with the institutions and 
practices of the society to which they belong but alienate members of the majority group who 
regard it as permitting unnecessary cruelty to animals. Even when the benefits in terms of 
promoting identification for some outweigh the costs in terms of undermining that 
identification for others, there is the further issue of whether the measure is consistent with 
justice, and where the limits of multicultural accommodation should be drawn.19 Here again 
there is the potential for conflict between the just treatment of individuals or groups and 
promoting the conditions that are required for, or facilitate, the creation or maintenance of a 
reasonably just society, at least if we assume that shared identification of the kind described 
in (v) is one such condition. And once again we should be wary of treating individuals or 
groups unjustly, or allowing them to be treated unjustly, when the gains in terms of 
promoting one of the conditions of a just society are relatively small or uncertain. 
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5. Conclusion 
Multiculturalism has been criticised for discouraging integration. What I have tried to do in 
this paper is to show, firstly, that ‘integration’ is multiply ambiguous and that the term is 
often given different meanings, sometimes in the same documents and speeches, without any 
acknowledgement; second, that multiculturalism, understood as a state-supported normative 
approach that gives public recognition to minority cultures or seeks to accommodate them, 
need not be hostile to policies aimed at facilitating integration in any of the main senses of 
‘integration’; third, that when the different meanings of integration are properly 
distinguished, some difficult questions arise about its value and practicality.  
Rather than seeking to promote integration in the sense of sharing a national identity, 
a culturally diverse society, such as Britain, might be better advised to foster a form of shared 
identification that does not rely upon such an identity. Different religious or cultural 
communities might be encouraged to attend to the reasons for valuing British institutions and 
practices that are available within their own particular moral outlooks, rather than being 
directed towards “British values” or told that they do not belong unless they endorse these 
values. A form of shared identification of this kind may be more realistically achievable, and 
some of the benefits that are alleged to flow from a shared national identity, such as a 
reduction in alienation, may also flow from it, thereby facilitating the creation and 
maintenance of a reasonably just society.  
The vision of an integrated society in which members of different cultural and 
religious groups participate together on equal terms in its major spheres is an attractive one 
but a just society might be achievable even if meaningful interaction between members of 
minority groups and the majority group occurs only in a limited number of spheres; and 
under some non-ideal circumstances, institutions and practices that allow cultural minorities 
to separate to some degree if they so choose may have positive benefits in enabling their 
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members to acquire a more confident sense of their own identity, and to sustain some of the 
social bases of their self-respect. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 For a qualified defence of multiculturalism that consciously seeks to avoid essentialism, 
see Phillips A. (2007). I discuss the charge that multiculturalism is wedded to an essentialist 
view of culture in Mason (2007), pp. 221-243. 
2 For responses see Waldron (2002) and Quong (2006), 53-71. 
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3 Tariq Modood and Varun Uberoi regard the fostering of an inclusive national identity as a 
multiculturalist goal and see such a project as an integral part of multiculturalism in Britain: 
see Uberoi and Modood (2013 pp. 24-25). Goodhart’s view is that this is merely one strand 
of multiculturalism. It does not seem to me that multiculturalism, as part of its nature, 
involves a commitment to promoting an inclusive national identity, but Uberoi and Modood 
may nevertheless be correct that this is the characteristic form it has taken in Britain. 
4 In doing so, I am building on my earlier work on these issues: see Mason (2010). 
5 For example, perhaps David Miller is correct that a shared national identity is required to 
sustain schemes of social justice that involve redistribution to those not able to provide for 
their own needs, but that such an identity could be achieved only through a process of mutual 
adaptation. 
6 One of the challenges for empirical work in this area is to determine whether segregation 
causes inequality or inequality causes segregation. See Finney and Simpson (2009, p. 135), 
and Uslaner (2012, p. 41). 
7 These are not Anderson’s only reasons for thinking that integration is vital for a society. 
She also argues that segregation undermines democracy by impeding the formation of 
intergroup political coalitions, promoting a factionalised politics, and blocking the 
mechanisms needed to make officeholders accountable to everyone regardless of ethnicity; 
see Anderson (2010), Ch. 5. And she argues that segregation fosters elites who lack the 
motivation or understanding to attend to the interests of the excluded; see Anderson (2007, 
pp. 602-603). 
8 Uslaner argues that the development of friendships across groups is also important: ‘Living 
in a diverse and integrated neighbourhood with close friends of different backgrounds leads 
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to a greater likelihood of trust. Living in a segregated and less diverse neighbourhood 
without friends of different backgrounds makes someone less trusting’ (Uslander 2012, p. 
43). 
9 The Cantle Report (Cantle, T. 2012), whilst not arguing against the public funding of faith 
schools, saw them as a potential barrier to community cohesion. In order to overcome this 
barrier, it argued that all schools should offer at least 25% of places to reflect other cultures 
or ethnicities in the local area (ibid., p. 33), that faith schools in particular should offer 25% 
of their places to other faiths or denominations (ibid., p. 37), and that education should in 
general be multicultural, and should be designed to promote understanding of, and respect 
for, the cultures in the school and the surrounding area (ibid., pp, 35, 49). Harry Brighouse 
also argues that 70% of places at a faith school should be allocated by a lottery that gives no 
preference to those who come from families that share the faith of the school; see 
Brighouse (2009, pp. 89-90). Others have argued that there needs to be greater support for 
faith-based and non-faith based school initiatives designed to promote meaningful 
engagement between different communities; see Parker-Jenkins and Glenn (2011, 1-20). 
10 In October 2006 a Muslim teaching assistant was suspended in a West Yorkshire school 
for insisting on wearing a veil in lessons.  
11 In September 2013, Judge Peter Murphy ruled that a Muslim woman could stand trial 
wearing a full face veil but had to remove it when giving evidence, on the grounds that ‘the 
ability of the jury to see the defendant for the purposes of evaluating her evidence is 
crucial.’  
12 In October 2006, Jack Straw (then Leader of the House of Commons) described the veil as 
‘a visible statement of separation and difference’, and whilst defending the right of Muslim 
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women to wear it, urged them to reflect upon the implications of doing so for 
communication between members of different cultural and religious groups, and indeed 
community relations in general.  
13 In fairness to Anderson, it should be noted that she does not deny the value of some 
degree (and forms) of self-segregation: see Anderson (2010 ), pp. 183-185. 
14 In the Prevent strategy document published after Cameron’s speech, democracy, the rule 
of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and 
beliefs, were identified as core British values (see Home Office 2011, p. 44). In June 2014, in 
the wake of the so-called ‘Trojan Horse’ row, Cameron said: ‘I would say freedom, 
tolerance, respect for the rule of law, belief in personal and social responsibility and respect 
for British institutions – those are the sorts of things that I would hope would be inculcated 
into the curriculum in any school in Britain whether it was a private school, state school, 
faith-based school, free school, academy or anything else’; see (BBC 2014a). In a similar 
vein, the Department of Education’s guidance on promoting British values in schools that 
was published in November 2014 identified democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, 
and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs, as fundamental 
British values.  
15 In his speech on ‘Managed Migration and Earned Citizenship’ (Brown 2008), Brown added 
‘internationalism’ to his list, understood as a kind of outward lookingness.  
16 Uberoi and Modood argue that in an earlier article I ignore the possibility that particular 
institutions may be partially constituted by universal liberal-democratic values. They write 
‘Mason suggests that the realisations of universal values can be distinctive, rather than the 
values themselves, but this assumes a neat separation. For example, he claims that the 
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value of democracy is realised in Britain, inter alia, through parliament, but surely the latter 
is also partially constituted by this value, and democracy takes different forms in different 
countries. This suggests that such values can be distinguished analytically from their 
instantiations, but can also take a distinctive form in them, and this possibility is ignored.’ 
(Uberoi and Modood 2013, p. 30). Parliament may be democratic because (some of) its 
members are elected, but it does not follow that it is constituted by democracy; indeed 
historically speaking Parliament has taken non-democratic forms (Compare: the National 
Health Service may be just because it distributes health care justly, but it does not follow 
that it is constituted by the just distribution of health care, and indeed it is perfectly possible 
that it will evolve in ways that make its health care provision unjust.) More generally, it 
seems to me that if we can distinguish a value from its instantiation, then it is possible to 
characterise the value in a way that is independent of its instantiations. And if we can 
characterise a value independently of its instantiations, then this is because these 
instantiations are a means or a vehicle for its realisation, in which case they are not partially 
constituted by the value itself. When the value itself takes a distinctive form in a set of 
institutions that is because those institutions embody a particular interpretation of it. For 
example, representative institutions involve a rejection of the idea that representation is an 
abandonment of democracy. 
17 Similar disagreements about the limits of freedom of expression emerged again in public 
debates in Britain in 2005 after the publication of cartoons depicting Muhammad in the 
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and also in 2011 and 2012 when other cartoons 
depicting the prophet were published in the Paris-based satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. 
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18 Might we say that the kind of shared identification I am describing is a form that a shared 
national identity might take? Might those who identify with different institutions and 
practices, or the same institutions and practices for different reasons, be regarded as being 
British in different ways? This issue is partly just semantic, but it seems to me that the 
shared identification I am describing is a rather different phenomenon from what we 
ordinarily regard as sharing a national identity since the latter involves ‘a sense of belonging 
together’, that is, a belief amongst a group of people that there is some deep reason why 
they should associate together politically, a reason that does not simply reduce to the fact 
that they are living within the borders of a state for a whole variety of contingent reasons. 
19 The issue here is not simply whether the practice being permitted by the exemption is itself 
unjust. There is also the question of whether exemptions of this kind are inherently unfair, or 
whether they are required by fairness in some cases. In this article I have tried to sidestep this 
issue. For important contributions to the debate over it, see see Barry (2001, pp. 146-193); 
Parekh, (1998, 397-411); Waldron (2002); and Quong (2006). 
 
Notes on Contributor 
Andrew Mason is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Warwick. 
 
References 
Allport, G., 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison.  
Anderson, E., 2007. Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective. 
Ethics, Vol. 117, 595-622.  
 33 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Anderson, E., 2010. The Imperative of Integration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Barry, B., 2001. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
Cambridge: Polity.  
BBC News, 2006a. School Suspends Woman over Veil. 13 October. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/6046992.stm [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
BBC News, 2006b. In quotes: Jack Straw on the veil. 6 October Available from:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5413470.stm [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
 
BBC News, 2013. Muslim woman must remove veil to give trial evidence. 16 September. 
Available from:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-24112067 [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
BBC News, 2014. Trojan Horse row: British values appeal overwhelming, says PM. 10 June. 
Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-27778272 [Accessed 30 May 2016].  
Blair, T., 2006. Our Nation’s Future – Multiculturalism and Integration. Speech delivered on 
8 December 2006. Available at 
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/ITN/2006/12/08/R08120603/?v=1 [Accessed 30 May 
2016]. 
Brighouse, H., 2009. Faith Schools, Personal Autonomy and Democratic Competence. In 
Haydon, G. (Ed.), Faith in Education: A tribute to Terence McLaughlin. London: Institute of 
Education.   
 34 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Brown, G., 2004. The Future of Britishness. 27 February. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/feb/27/immigrationpolicy.race [Accessed on 30 
May 2016].  
Brown, G., 2008. Managed Migration and Earned Citizenship. 20 February. Available at: 
http://www.peterjepson.com/law/Citizen/PM's%20Citizenship%20speech.pdf [Accessed on 
30 May 2016]. 
Cameron, D., 2011. Speech at the Munich Security Conference. 5 February. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference 
[Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
Cameron, D., 2014. Mail on Sunday, 15 June 2014. Available at:  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2658171/DAVID-CAMERON-British-values-
arent-optional-theyre-vital-Thats-I-promote-EVERY-school-As-row-rages-Trojan-Horse-
takeover-classrooms-Prime-Minister-delivers-uncompromising-pledge.html [Accessed 30 
May 2016]. 
Cantle, T., 2012. Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Identity. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dept. of Education., 2014. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-
promoting-british-values-in-schools-published [Accessed on 30 May 2016]. 
Finney, N and Simpson, L., 2009. ‘Sleepwalking to segregation’? Challenging Myths About 
Race and Migration. Bristol: Policy Press.  
 35 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Goodhart, D., 2013. The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-War Immigration. 
London: Atlantic Books.  
Home Office, 2001. Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team 
Chaired by Ted Cantle. London: HMSO.  
Home Office, 2005. Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: The Government’s 
Strategy to Increase Race Equality and Community Cohesion.  London: HMSO.   
Home Office, 2011. Prevent Strategy: Cm 8092. London: HMSO. [Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent
-strategy-review.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
Jenkins, R., 1967. Essays and Speeches. Lester, A. (Ed). London: Collins.  
Johnston, R., Forrest, J., and Poulsen, M. 2002. Are There Ethnic Enclaves/Ghettos in 
English Cities? Urban Studies, Vol. 39, 591-618.  
Johnston, R., Forrest, J., and Poulsen, M. 2005. On the Measurement and Meaning of 
Residential Segregation: A Response to Simpson. Urban Studies, Vol. 42, 1221-7.  
Kukathas, C., 2003. The Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Kymlicka, W., 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Miller, D., 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 36 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Mason, A., 2000. Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their 
Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Mason, A., 2007. Multiculturalism and the Critique of Essentialism. In Laden, A. and Owen, 
D. (Eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Mason, A., 2010. Integration, Cohesion, and National Identity: Theoretical Reflections on 
Recent British Policy. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, 857-874. 
Mason, A., 2012. Living Together as Equals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Mason, A., 2014. Citizenship Tests: Can They Be a Just Compromise? Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 45, 137-161.  
Merry, M., Equality, Citizenship, and Segregation: A Defense of Separation. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Modood, T., 2013. Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea Second Edition. Cambridge: Polity.   
Okin, S., 1999. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? In Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
In Cohen, J. et al (Eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Parekh, B., 1998. Equality in a multicultural society. Citizenship Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 397-
411. 
Parekh, B., 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.   
 37 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parker-Jenkins, M., and Glenn, M., 2011. Levels of Community Cohesion: Theorizing the 
UK Agenda and the Implications for Policy and Practice in Schools. International Journal of 
Multicultural Education, Vol. 13, 1-20. 
Pettigrew, T., and Tropp, L., 2006. A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 90, 751-783. 
Phillips, A., 2007. Multiculturalism without Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Phillips, M., 2005. This lethal moral madness. Daily Mail, 14 July. Available at: 
http://melaniephillips.com/this-lethal-moral-madness [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
Phillips, T., 2005. After 7/7: Sleepwalking to Segregation. Speech delivered on 22 September 
2005. Summary available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/19/race.socialexclusion [Accessed 1 October 
2016]. 
Quong, J., 2006. Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal Opportunities. Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, 53-71. 
Simpson, L., 2004. Statistics of Racial Segregation: Measures, Evidence, and Policy. Urban 
Studies, Vol 41, 661-681.  
Steyn, M., 2005. A victory for multiculti over common sense. Daily Telegraph, 19 July. 
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3618488/A-victory-for-
multiculti-over-common-sense.html [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
 38 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Uberoi, V. and Modood, T., 2013. Inclusive Britishness: A Multiculturalist Advance.  
Political Studies, Vol. 61, 23-41.   
Uslaner, E., 2012. Segregation and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation, and Social Cohesion 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Waldron, J., 2002. One Law for All: The Logic of Cultural Accommodation. Washington and 
Lee Law Review, Vol. 59, 3, 3-36. 
West, E., 2013. The Diversity Illusion: What We Got Wrong About Immigration and How to 
Set It Right. Gibson Square Books. 
 
